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This Symposium has focused primarily on recent efforts by several 
states of the United States to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions.  These state-level efforts include common law liability actions 
(such as public nuisance lawsuits) brought by several states against 
large GHG emitters.1  They also include states’ regulation of GHG 
emissions from mobile sources (such as California’s 2002 law restrict-
ing carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles 2) and from station-
ary sources (such as California’s Global Warming Act of 2006,3 an 
emerging initiative of western states, and the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) of seven northeastern states4).  They include ef-
forts by states to force the federal government to act, such as the law-
suit in Massachusetts v. EPA,5 recently decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.6
† Perkins Professor of Law and Professor of Environmental Policy & Public Policy 
Studies, Duke University; University Fellow, Resources for the Future; Visiting Profes-
sor, University of Chicago Law School, Spring 2007. 
1 E.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Complaint, California ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 20, 2006). 
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2007). 
3 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 38500–38599 (West 2007). 
4 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative [RGGI], http://www.rggi.org (last visited 
May 1, 2007).  The states participating in the RGGI include Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.  See id. 
5 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455, 1462 (2007) (finding in a 5-4 decision that Massachusetts 
does have standing to sue, and that the EPA does have statutory authority to regulate 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles as “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act).  In a 
related case, petitioners urge that the EPA has authority to regulate GHG emissions 
from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act; this case has been stayed in the D.C. 
Circuit pending the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.  Coke Oven Envtl. Task Force v. 
EPA, No. 06-1182 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2006) (order granting motion to hold case in 
abeyance).  It is important to note that these lawsuits could force the federal govern-
ment to regulate and would thereby have a larger impact than policies adopted in the 
states themselves. 
6 Other lawsuits are pending in the courts, including some by private plaintiffs 
seeking damages for Hurricane Katrina (in the district courts for the Southern District 
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The papers in this Symposium make many useful contributions.  
And the state-level actions reflect creative legal strategies intended to 
achieve a major environmental objective.  In this brief Commentary, I 
will not seek to recapitulate the papers’ insights nor to address each 
paper individually. 
Instead, I will make one basic point:  subnational state-level action 
is not the best way to combat global climate change.  This is true even 
assuming that forestalling global climate change is of utmost impor-
tance,7 and even where the state-level policies are individually well de-
signed.  The basic point remains that local action is not well suited to 
regulating mobile global conduct yielding a global externality.  In this 
Commentary I will argue that subnational state-level action, by itself, is 
of limited value, and may even yield perverse results; and, given that 
such state-level action is already occurring, I will suggest what its best 
uses may be in light of these limitations. 
of Mississippi and the Southern District of Florida), some to force federal agencies to 
address climate change in their environmental impact statements under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, some under the Alien Tort Claims Act, at least one under 
the Endangered Species Act (brought by the Center for Biological Diversity, seeking 
the listing of polar bears as a threatened species, in response to which the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service issued a proposed rule to list the polar bear as threatened, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 1064, 1064 ( Jan. 9, 2007)), and one brought by the Inuit Circumpolar Confer-
ence in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on December 7, 2005, see 
Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law, Inuit File Petition with Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, Claiming Global Warming Caused by United States Is Destroying Their 
Culture and Livelihoods, (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.ciel.org/Climate/ICC_Petition_ 
7Dec05.html.  Further claims might be brought by corporate shareholders against 
their officers and directors for failure to safeguard corporate value against impending 
climate change policies.  David Buente and Linda Malone noted many of these cases in 
their comments at this Symposium.  A useful overview of the various legal actions 
brought by the states and others, as of late 2006, is provided in JUSTIN R. PIDOT, 
GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS:  AN 
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL ISSUES (2006), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/documents/GWL_Report.pdf, 
and JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., GLOBAL WARMING IN THE 
COURTS:  A LITIGATION UPDATE (2007), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/ 
gelpi/current_research/documents/GWL_Update_3.13.07.pdf. 
7 For the purpose of analyzing the state-level policies compared to alternative 
abatement policies, this Commentary takes as given the premise that global climate 
change is a serious risk that warrants preventive measures.  I reviewed this evidence 
and the benefits and costs of climate policies in RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. 
WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY:  BEYOND KYOTO 18-25 (2003).  For the 
latest IPCC statement on the science, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE [IPCC], WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
BASIS 2-18 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/Report/AR4WG1_SPM.pdf. 
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The resort to state-level action is understandable, and perhaps 
predictable, given the U.S. government’s decisions (so far) not to rat-
ify the Kyoto Protocol 8 and not to enact federal legislation regulating 
GHG emissions.9  It is nonetheless well understood that these state-
level efforts, even those of large states such as California, will have lit-
tle impact on global emissions and hence little impact on global cli-
mate.  Moreover, the state-level actions must surmount numerous le-
gal hurdles.  Worse, state-level efforts could be not only ineffectual, 
but counterproductive, increasing net global emissions and undercut-
ting a wider effort to constrain global emissions. 
Nevertheless, if well-designed, state-level strategies could yield 
some significant results, including (i) stimulating technological inno-
vation that could diffuse to other unregulated places; (ii) learning by 
experimentation with alternative policy designs; and (iii) raising the 
specter of a patchwork of inconsistent state regulations as a political 
gambit to motivate industry to support broader federal regulation. 
“Think globally, act locally” is good advice for many problems, es-
pecially when interpreted not only spatially, but also conceptually as 
8 The United States negotiated, signed and ratified the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, 1994 U.N.T.S. 164, 37 I.L.M. 22 
(entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter FCCC].  The United States negotiated 
and signed, but did not ratify, the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).  President Clinton did not submit the Kyoto Pro-
tocol to the Senate for ratification.  In March 2001, President George W. Bush de-
clared his decision to withdraw the United States from the Kyoto Protocol.  See Andrew 
C. Revkin, Bush’s Shift Could Doom Air Pact, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A7; 
David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue To Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 2001 at A1. 
9 The McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139 revised as S. Amend. 
2028, 108th Cong. (2003), received forty-three affirmative votes (and fifty-five against) 
in the U.S. Senate on October 30, 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S13598 (2003), and thirty-
eight affirmative votes in the Senate on June 23, 2005, 151 CONG. REC. S7029 (2005) 
(voted on as S. Amend. 826 to H.R. Res. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)).  In June 2005, by a 
fifty-four to forty-three vote, 151 CONG. REC. S7037 (2005), the Senate adopted the 
Bingaman-Domenici “sense of the Senate” amendment, S. Amend. 866 to H.R. 6, 
109th Cong. (2005), calling for federal regulation of GHGs, but did not enact legisla-
tion to implement such regulation.  Several other Senators of both political parties 
have also introduced bills on climate policy, including Senators Carper, Feinstein, 
Hagel, Kerry, Snowe, Lugar, Biden, Sanders, and Boxer.  No such bill has passed the 
House.  For a list and summary of these and other climate policy bills in the U.S. Con-
gress, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, What’s Being Done in Congress, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress (last visited May 1, 
2007) (discussing the 106th through 109th Congresses); Pew Ctr. on Global Climate 
Change, Senate Greenhouse Cap-and-Trade Proposals in the 110th Congress, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentID=725 (last visited May 1, 
2007) (discussing the 110th Congress). 
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advice to adopt a systems analysis mental framework:  consider the 
complex interconnected whole, and then do what you can to help out 
in your particular niche while avoiding adverse side effects on other 
domains.10  But “think globally, act locally” is not such good advice for 
protecting global public goods when the externalities arise from wide-
spread and geographically moveable sources, and when local action 
would have a trivial effect or would merely shift those sources to other 
locales (potentially causing even greater harm).  Because there is no 
global sovereign to institute global regulation, successful action will 
require cooperation by the major global actors—a diverse group of 
powerful national governments who will act only if they perceive their 
own net benefits to doing so and who are bound to a treaty only if 
they agree to join.11  Action by each major national government de-
pends on its confidence that other major countries will also act.  The 
difficult policy challenge of climate change is thus to produce a global 
public good via the mutual consent of multiple heterogeneous actors.  
It requires us to “think globally, act globally.” 
I.  LEGAL OBSTACLES TO STATE-LEVEL ACTION 
Before addressing the policy problems with subnational state-level 
actions to reduce GHG emissions, let me briefly mention the impor-
tant legal hurdles they must overcome in the U.S. legal system.  Com-
mon law liability actions (such as public nuisance claims) must pass 
several tests.  They must prove causation, including general causation:  
do human GHG emissions cause global climate change, and especially 
the changes that injure the plaintiffs?  Plaintiffs must also prove spe-
cific causation:  did this defendant’s GHG emissions cause this plain-
tiff’s harm?12  Proving causation in court and satisfying the tests for ju-
dicial admissibility of scientific expert testimony to prove causation 
may well be more difficult than persuading legislators or regulators to 
act based on uncertain model forecasts.  Relatedly, the plaintiffs may 
need to show standing to sue (are their injuries too general?  are they 
redressable?),13 fend off preemption by the Clean Air Act, establish 
10 This is the basic advice of RISK VS. RISK:  TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT ( John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
11 Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:  Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 683 (1999). 
12 With a globally mixing pollutant causing global impacts, some version of market 
share proportionate liability could be applicable. 
13 See supra note 5. 
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the elements of negligence, deflect the political question doctrine,14 
and find a remedy for future injuries that the court will be willing to 
award. 
Meanwhile, state regulation of GHG emissions may face a variety 
of legal obstacles, including challenges (i) under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, especially if states attempt to regulate or tax emissions 
embedded in products (such as goods, services, and electricity) im-
ported into the state from other states; (ii) under the Dormant Treaty 
Clause or more generally for interference with the foreign affairs 
power of the federal government, especially where U.S. states purport 
to enter into agreements with foreign countries such as Great Britain 
or the European Union;15 (iii) under theories of preemption by fed-
eral statutes such as the Clean Air Act; and (iv) under the Interstate 
Compacts Clause, in the cases of RGGI, western states, or other coop-
erative multistate programs.16
Even if these legal hurdles can be surmounted, there remains a 
high political hurdle for state-level actions:  because GHGs mix glob-
ally and have global impacts, local abatement actions pose local costs, 
yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits.  This in turn suggests 
that local actions will often be difficult to enact.  Each state (or coun-
try) has an incentive to free ride on other states’ (or countries’) ac-
tions, enjoying the global benefits without bearing the local costs.  
The result is underinvestment in abatement, unless cooperation can 
be organized.17  Indeed, a “race to the bottom” is even more likely in 
the case of a globally mixing pollutant with no local impacts, because 
local decisions to relax regulations would reduce costs without incur-
ring the local pollution harms associated with conventional pollutants. 
Yet in fact we do see state-level actions being undertaken in the 
Northeast and in California, as well as action by the European Union 
despite U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.  Such action may 
look worthwhile to those who think the costs are low, or favor emis-
14 The court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. based its dismissal on the 
political question doctrine.  See  406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
15 For discussion, see Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Green-
house Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877 (2006). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see generally Claire Carothers, Note, United We Stand:  The 
Interstate Compact as a Tool for Effecting Climate Change, 41 GA. L. REV. 229 (2006). 
17 One study found that countries acting on their own would engage in only 4% of 
the GHG abatement that they would find worthwhile to undertake under a global co-
operative regime.  See William D. Nordhaus & Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-
Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 741, 762 
(1996). 
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sions reductions regardless of the costs, or favor a state patchwork to 
motivate industry support for a federal (or global) regime, or perceive 
real costs but favor moving first in order to learn by doing, or perceive 
real costs but favor action that would impose higher costs on other 
states or industries (raising rivals’ costs), or are governors or other 
high officials with broader political ambitions.  The political coalitions 
in each state that help secure the enactment of GHG limitations may 
reflect the combination of ambitious leaders with so-called “Baptists 
and bootleggers”18 coalitions—environmentalists seeking to protect 
the climate, and industry segments (such as alternative energy 
sources) seeking to raise their rivals’ costs.19
II.  NORMATIVE DISADVANTAGES OF STATE-LEVEL ACTIONS 
But even if these legal and political obstacles can be overcome 
(and it seems that they are being overcome to some degree, though 
challenges still await in California and in RGGI), there remains the 
normative question—whether these state-level actions are desirable. 
No matter where they are emitted, GHGs mix globally in the at-
mosphere and have global impacts.  The benefits of emissions abate-
ment are therefore shared globally.  Climate protection is a global 
public good, and the challenge is to produce this global public good 
via the consent of heterogeneous national actors.  Subnational state-
level actions will have a small impact on the global picture, and could 
even be perverse. 
Each state of the United States—even California—contributes a 
small share of global GHG emissions.  Certainly, no state could effec-
tively control its own ambient level of carbon dioxide or other GHGs, 
because that ambient level is determined by the worldwide concentra-
tion of GHGs in the atmosphere.  This shows, incidentally, why regula-
tion of carbon dioxide under the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards (NAAQS) and State Implementation Plans (SIPs) of Clean Air 
Act sections 109 and 110 would likely fail if carbon dioxide were listed 
as a “pollutant” by the EPA under section 108 of the Clean Air Act.  
No SIP could, on its own, attain a serious NAAQS for GHGs without 
international cooperation.  The problem is not whether carbon diox-
18 See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation, in THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 29, 33-36 ( Jason F. Shogren ed., 
1989). 
19 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regula-
tion, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 760-61 (1999). 
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ide qualifies as a pollutant, but that state-based ambient standards are 
a mismatch with a globally mixing GHG.20  Only international coop-
eration on emissions limitations can effectively reduce ambient con-
centrations. 
Even the Kyoto Protocol is not sufficiently global, because it omits 
emissions limits on the world’s largest sources—the United States and 
China, as well as Australia, India, Brazil, and others.  When the Kyoto 
Protocol was negotiated in 1997, developing countries were forecast to 
surpass industrialized countries in carbon dioxide emissions by about 
2030.21  Subsequent studies have moved that date ever closer—so 
much so that China is now forecast to surpass the United States in 
carbon dioxide emissions by 2009.22  The net effect of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on global emissions and concentrations may thus be quite mod-
est. 
Subglobal action (and, a fortiori, subnational action) to reduce 
GHGs has several disadvantages.  First, because the sources of GHGs 
are globally widespread, even ubiquitous, in every country and every 
sector of the economy, subglobal regulatory coverage fails to control 
important sources of pollutants.  Second, it forfeits the greater cost 
savings obtainable in a larger allowance trading market encompassing 
more countries.  Third, it raises the likelihood of market power being 
exercised by large players in the smaller allowance trading market.  
And, fourth, perhaps most important, it suffers from cross-border 
“leakage” of emissions:  subglobal regulatory coverage encourages 
source activities to shift or “leak” to unregulated areas over time. 
Leakage results from the movement of three levers:  a price effect, 
a “slack off” effect, and a capital relocation effect.  The price effect 
20 If the EPA must regulate GHGs under the NAAQS program of Clean Air Act 
section 109, one possible solution would be for states to decline to issue SIPs, or for the 
EPA to declare all such SIPs inadequate, and for the EPA to issue a national Federal 
Implementation Plan (FIP), adopting a national emissions control regime.  Indeed, 
this could be a clever way to use the Clean Air Act to develop a national cap-and-trade 
policy by administrative action rather than by legislation.  Meanwhile, federal emis-
sions standards for motor vehicles, as sought by petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 
S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007), would not pose the problem of state-level ambient objectives 
to be attained by SIPs. 
21 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 171 (1998). 
22 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.com/graphs/Slide4.gif.  In April 2007, the 
IEA's chief economist, Fatih Birol, reported that China could surpass the United States 
even sooner, in 2007.  See China To Top USA in Greenhouse Emissions, USA TODAY.COM, 
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/climate/globalwarming/2007-04-24-china-emissions_N.htm 
(last visited May 1, 2007). 
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operates in the short term, without any relocation of industry.  Con-
sider action by only one country to limit GHG emissions, by conserv-
ing energy or protecting forests.  Emissions abatement in Country A 
would reduce the demand for fossil fuels in Country A, lowering the 
world market price for such fuels and thereby increasing the quantity 
demanded in Country B (a country not regulating its emissions).  
Similarly, restricting forest clearing in Country A would restrict timber 
supply and raise the world market price for timber, inducing an in-
crease in the quantity of timber harvested in Country B.  Prices also 
affect trade in emissions-intensive products:  as Country A restricts its 
emissions, the price of emissions-intensive goods produced within 
Country A will rise and the quantity will decrease.  Unregulated pro-
ducers in Country B will respond by increasing their production of 
these emissions-intensive goods, both for domestic consumption and 
for export to Country A.  The magnitude of these effects depends on 
the price elasticities of the emissions-intensive activities (i.e., how 
much the activity levels change in response to price changes) and on 
the degree of integration of world markets for the relevant goods and 
services. 
The “slack off” effect is a response to changing national net bene-
fits.  In the absence of a treaty, Country A might undertake some 
abatement, just to the point where its (small) domestic share of the 
global marginal benefits equals its domestic marginal costs of abate-
ment.  Country B would do likewise.  But if Country A begins to abate 
its own emissions more aggressively, some additional global protection 
would be obtained, and the marginal benefit to Country B of its own 
abatement efforts would be diminished slightly (on the standard as-
sumption of diminishing marginal benefits of protection), so that the 
domestically rational degree of abatement in Country B would fall.  
Hence, as some states emit less, other states rationally emit more. 
Finally, in the longer term, restrictions on emissions in Country A 
could induce emissions-intensive industries to uproot and relocate fa-
cilities to unregulated Country B in order to produce their products at 
lower cost and export their products to world markets (including back 
to the regulated country).  The extent of this relocation effect de-
pends on the openness to trade and investment flows of the world 
economy, and on the marginal cost of the emissions constraint rela-
tive to the marginal cost of relocating. 
I have illustrated these examples using hypothetical Countries A 
and B.  The same analysis applies a fortiori to action by a single state 
of the United States.  Indeed, states of the United States are likely to 
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be even more vulnerable to leakage than are many countries in the 
international arena.  First, individual states are more fully integrated 
into the open trade of the national American market (as well as inter-
national markets) than are some countries.  For example, for U.S. 
states, a major concern is that electricity supply would shift immedi-
ately and seamlessly from regulated in-state sources to unregulated 
out-of-state sources connected to the same shared electrical transmis-
sion grid.  This type of leakage may not be as serious a concern for 
countries with their own delimited national electricity systems.  Sec-
ond, the Dormant Commerce Clause may place more stringent re-
strictions on U.S. states’ efforts to restrict or tax emissions-intensive 
imports from other states than those imposed by GATT/WTO trade 
disciplines on countries’ efforts to do the same internationally. 
The total amount of leakage depends on the force of these three 
levers and on a fourth variable:  the relative emissions per unit of eco-
nomic activity in the regulated and unregulated places.  Assume, for 
example, that reducing fuel use in Country A by two units induces an 
increase in fuel use in Country B of one unit (a leakage rate of 50%).  
But if that additional unit of fuel used in Country B results in more 
than twice as many (or twice as potent) GHG emissions as did the two 
units of fuel used in Country A, then the leakage rate could exceed 
100%.  (This might occur, for example, if Country B lets the fuel’s 
more potent methane component escape to the atmosphere rather 
than fully combusting it into less-potent carbon dioxide as is done in 
Country A.)  Or, if reducing timber harvesting in Country A by two 
units induces an increase in timber harvesting in Country B by one 
unit, but the carbon release per hectare harvested in Country B is 
more than twice that in Country A (for example, because loggers in B 
employ methods that cause greater collateral damage to the forest, or 
clear soils or tree types containing more carbon than in A), then the 
leakage rate would exceed 100%. 
Depending on the magnitude and direction of these four factors, 
leakage could be large or small.  In the 1990s, several studies pro-
duced a wide range of estimates, finding that under emissions limits 
imposed by the member states of the EU or the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), leakage would offset 
at least 4%, and potentially more than 100%, of the emissions abate-
ment achieved initially.23  More recently, estimates for RGGI showed 
23 B.S. Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combatting Climate 
Change, in IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLI-
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60% to 90% leakage rates due to electricity imports alone.24  States 
could potentially address this problem by finding ways to reduce the 
costs of emissions reductions (such as by adopting cap-and-trade sys-
tems) and by requiring electricity importers, just like electricity gen-
erators within the state, to hold allowances for the emissions associ-
ated with the electricity they sell (though this might raise a Dormant 
Commerce Clause issue, even if imposed evenhandedly on out-of-state 
and in-state producers). 
As the world economy becomes increasingly open and integrated, 
the fluidity and immediacy of the price effect and the longer-term re-
location effects will grow, exacerbating leakage.25  In a recent study 
produced by the MIT Joint Program on Science and Policy Global 
Change—one of the world’s leading academic research centers on 
climate policy—the international leakage rate ranged up to 130%.26  
Indeed, the acceleration of China’s GHG emissions over the last dec-
ade could in part reflect the role of leakage from the EU and other 
areas regulating GHGs. 
MATE CHANGE 424-25 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) (reviewing numerous studies); 
Jean-Charles Hourcade et al., A Review of Mitigation Cost Studies, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
1995:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra, at 297, 341-43 
(same).  These studies differ in their sectoral coverage, representations of interna-
tional trade flows, and levers of leakage considered; most omitted the possibility of 
higher GHG emissions per unit of resource use in the unregulated countries.  Other 
surveys of leakage estimates in the 1990s include NICK MABEY ET AL., ARGUMENT IN THE 
GREENHOUSE:  THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF CONTROLLING GLOBAL WARMING 
26, 266-302, 397-400 (1997); Stefan Felder & Thomas F. Rutherford, Unilateral CO2 Re-
ductions and Carbon Leakage:  The Consequences of International Trade in Oil and Basic Mate-
rials, 25 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 162, 175 (1993); John Pezzey, Analysis of Unilateral 
CO2 Control in the European Community and OECD, ENERGY  J., July 1992, at 159, 166. 
24 The Magnificent Seven:  States Take the Lead on Global Warming, GRAPEVINE ONLINE, 
Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.aceee.org/about/0601rggi.htm (“Leakage is a big issue for 
RGGI—initial carbon-cap runs showed that leakage could offset 60-90% of RGGI’s 
emission reductions, as power plants in nearby states increase their output to sell into 
the higher-priced RGGI power markets.”). 
25 See Onno Kuik & Reyer Gerlagh, Trade Liberalization and Carbon Leakage, ENERGY 
J., July 2003, at 97, 98 (“[F]ree international trade may weaken the effectiveness of en-
vironmental regulations.”).  At present, the world trading system seems headed toward 
ever more openness and hence more mobile trade, capital, and labor.  For a popular 
treatment of this prediction, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005). 
26 Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 
65 J. INT’L ECON. 421 (2005) (finding that in a multiregional computable general equi-
librium model, significant relocation of energy-intensive industries away from the 
OECD may occur, depending on the type of market structure, with leakage rates as 
high as 130%, meaning that GHG control policies in the industrialized countries may 
actually lead to higher global emissions). 
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One effect of local emissions limitations, however, works in the 
opposite direction.  Leakage may be less severe (and prior studies may 
overstate its magnitude) if enough new technology is generated in the 
regulating country (or state) and if this technology diffuses to sources 
in the unregulated countries (or states).27  One study of endogenous 
technological change estimated that, with very high price elasticities, 
the technological innovation and diffusion effect can even outweigh 
the price-driven leakage effect so that net leakage from subglobal 
GHG regulation becomes negative—that is, regulation to reduce 
emissions in one country can induce net abatement and emissions re-
duction in unregulated countries.28  Thus, the degree of net leakage is 
an empirical question and depends importantly on the type of tech-
nologies developed and diffused in response to emissions limitations. 
Leakage has several undesirable consequences.  First, leakage un-
dermines the environmental effectiveness of the emissions limitations 
in the country (or state) taking action.  If leakage exceeds 100%, the 
subglobal regime would actually increase global emissions.  At the 
least, the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory regime must be assessed 
in terms of its net effect on global emissions, not just in terms of its ef-
fect in the regulating jurisdiction. 
Second, even if leakage is actually unlikely, the mere fear of leak-
age and its adverse effects on competitiveness may be a political obsta-
cle to subglobal action.  Of special concern to national and state legis-
lators is the fear that regulating GHG emissions may cause the loss of 
local jobs and the relocation of employment away from the regulated 
voting districts—a form of outsourcing driven by GHG limitations.  
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed by a vote of ninety-five to zero in 
July 1997, announced the U.S. Senate’s insistence on participation by 
developing countries in any future climate treaty, on the ground that 
American action to restrict GHG emissions could impair the U.S. 
economy while driving GHG-intensive activities and jobs abroad.29  
27 Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, Unilateral Emission Reductions and Cross-Country 
Technology Spillovers, B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, vol. 4, no. 2, art. 3, at 2 (2004), 
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art3. 
28 Corrado Di Maria & Edwin van der Werf, Carbon Leakage Revisited:  Unilateral 
Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change 15-16 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Work-
ing Paper No. 94.2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912461. 
29 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997); see also 143 CONG. REC. 15,808 (1997) (re-
cording the vote).  For reports on the resolution’s passage, see Climate Change:  Senate 
Approves Resolution To Require Binding Controls on Developing Nations, 28 Env’t Rep. 
(BNA) 621 (Aug. 1, 1997).  Opined The New York Times a year later:  “[T]he giant de-
veloping countries like India and China have yet to be brought on board.  Until that 
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The day after the Kyoto Protocol was signed, the Clinton administra-
tion announced that it would not submit the treaty to the Senate for 
ratification until developing countries had agreed to accept emissions 
limitation responsibilities as well.30  Fear of competition with China 
and India and of outsourcing of American jobs has only grown over 
the past decade, even as concern about climate change has also 
grown.  It is undoubtedly the fear of leakage that has kept most state-
level GHG emissions limitations only modestly stringent. 
Third, leakage could also adversely influence the incentives of ini-
tially unregulated countries or states to join the regulatory regime 
later.  As leakage proceeds over time, it shifts the regulated activity to 
the unregulated area (in our example above, to Country B), and 
thereby renders the unregulated economy even more emissions-
intensive than it had been before the regulation began.  This makes it 
ever harder to persuade an initial nonparticipant (here, Country B) to 
become a signatory to the treaty later.31  This may well be reflected in 
the accelerated forecasts of China surpassing the United States in car-
bon dioxide emissions, noted above,32 and the continuing reluctance 
of the United States, China, and others to adopt GHG emissions limi-
tations. 
In sum, because the sources of global environmental externalities 
are widespread and moveable, subglobal regulation can omit impor-
tant sources today and induce leakage to unregulated areas tomorrow.  
Subglobal coverage can thus undermine or even reverse the environ-
mental benefits of the regulation, increase its costs, discourage initial 
action, and discourage future accession by initial nonparticipants.  Ef-
fective global environmental regulation will therefore require univer-
happens, Senate ratification is out of the question.”  Editorial, Remember Global Warm-
ing?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at A26.  After the Kyoto Protocol entered into force 
with ratifications by Canada, Japan, Russia, and European countries (thus reducing the 
concern about leakage and competitiveness losses to those countries), as evidence of 
the risks of unabated climate change mounted, and as the costs of a well-designed cap-
and-trade system were shown to be low, the U.S. Senate became more receptive to en-
acting domestic cap-and-trade legislation.  Forty-three senators voted in favor of the 
McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (though only thirty-eight voted 
for that bill in 2005), and several new bills addressing climate change were introduced 
in the 110th Congress.  See supra note 9. 
30 John M. Broder, Clinton Adamant on 3D World Role in Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 1997, at A1. 
31 See Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions, in ECO-
NOMICS AND POLICY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 137, 146 (William D. Nordhaus ed., 
1998). 
32 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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sal or nearly universal coverage of present and potential future source 
locations.33
III.  POSSIBLE PAYOFFS OF STATE-LEVEL ACTIONS 
Nevertheless, if well-designed, subnational state-level strategies 
could yield some payoffs, including (i) stimulating technological in-
novation that could diffuse to other unregulated places, (ii) learning 
by experimentation with alternative policy designs, and (iii) raising 
the specter of a patchwork of inconsistent state regulations as a politi-
cal gambit to motivate industry to support broader federal regulation. 
Regarding (i), the research on endogenous technological change 
cited above34 suggests that national GHG emissions limitation policies 
might promote technological change—and foster diffusion of those 
low-cost, emissions-reducing technologies to other countries—such 
that the leakage effects could be reduced or even, possibly, out-
weighed.  But it may be difficult or impossible for one U.S. state, even 
a state as large as California, to succeed with this strategy.  Further, 
trade liberalization is crucial to the diffusion of emissions-reducing 
technologies, but as international trade becomes more open, GHG 
leakage also rises.  And technology R&D programs (or spillover effects 
of endogenous innovation induced by local regulation) are unlikely to 
stimulate the diffusion and adoption of new technology unless they 
reduce its quality-adjusted price below the competing market prices 
for current technologies; otherwise there is no incentive for private 
firms to adopt the new technology.  Thus, a combination of both new 
technological innovation in some countries, and restrictions on GHG 
emissions that make emitting more costly in all source countries, will 
probably be needed to yield both innovation and diffusion (adoption) 
of new technologies.35
33 See MABEY ET AL., supra note 23, at 28 (“As long as international obligations to 
reduce CO2 emissions are limited to a few countries the problems of carbon leakage 
through energy market responses and industrial relocation will remain an obstacle to 
successful environmental protection.”); Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto’s Unfinished Busi-
ness, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 54, 60 (“[A] substantial reduction in global emis-
sions will require something close to worldwide participation . . . .”). 
34 See supra notes 27-28. 
35 “[T]echnology policy alone will not be able to cope adequately with the issue of 
global warming, since an incentive—for instance a carbon tax or emission limit—is 
necessary to induce technological change in the direction of developing and diffusing 
emission-saving technologies.”  J.P.M. SIJM ET AL., SPILLOVERS OF CLIMATE POLICY:  AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENCE OF CARBON LEAKAGE AND INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL 
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Regarding (ii), the experience in differing state-level actions can 
be valuable in informing the design of federal and international poli-
cies.  Design features of emissions trading systems can be compared 
across these experiments,36 such as taxes versus cap-and-trade, how to 
allocate allowances (e.g., for free or by auction), how to monitor emis-
sions and register trades, whether and how to cover all major GHGs, 
whether to give credit for offsets (in the United States or internation-
ally), how to give credit for protecting and enhancing sinks such as 
forests (and afforestation versus conservation of existing forests), 
whether to give credit for early action, whether to adopt a “safety 
valve” upper price limit (and at what price), and other choices.  The 
courts may also play a role in such policy development by authorizing 
the use of emissions trading and offsets markets as the remedies for 
public nuisance tort claims against GHG emitters.37  But there are at 
least two important cautions about this approach.  First, the value of 
the state experiments depends on their being set up to test policy al-
ternatives, and it is not clear that such tests are being consciously 
planned (though perhaps they will emerge nonetheless).  Second, the 
flip side of experimentation is that a proliferation of different GHG 
policies and allowance markets in different states—and across coun-
tries—may generate conflicting approaches and vested interests that 
are difficult to reconcile and mesh in a larger national or interna-
tional regime.  Differences across state policies may impede collabora-
tive linking among states (such as RGGI or a group of western states), 
which the states would like to arrange in order to reduce leakage and 
expand their trading market.  So whatever states do, there must be the 
latitude for a federal law, an interstate compact, or a treaty to revamp 
the system, and the expectation among parties that this may well oc-
cur.  Ultimately, of course, we may learn from the states’ experiments 
that it is better not to adopt some policies. 
Perhaps the state-level actions now being pursued will have payoff 
(iii) identified above,38 in which a patchwork of inconsistent state re-
gimes stimulates U.S. federal action to harmonize national regulation; 
CHANGE DUE TO CO2 ABATEMENT MEASURES 26 (2004), available at http://www.mnp.nl/ 
bibliotheek/rapporten/500036002.pdf. 
36 See ROBERT W. HAHN, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 44-54 
(1998) (advocating experimentation in institutional design). 
37 This helpful proposal is made by Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and 
Litigation Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation:  Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets 
into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1563 (2007). 
38 See supra text following note 33.   
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this in turn could lead to a broader global regime.39  Such a patch-
work strategy of inconsistent state actions could also reinforce the ex-
perimentation strategy (payoff (ii) noted above),40 but would be at 
odds with collaborative linking among states to expand their trading 
market.   
Describing this patchwork or domino effect in theory does not 
necessarily mean it will come to pass in reality.  Scholars have pointed 
to the patchwork dynamic as the pathway explaining the federaliza-
tion of state air pollution control laws in the Clean Air Act of 1970.41  
But this dynamic depends on widespread and inconsistent actions be-
ing taken by the states in order to motivate industry to lobby in favor 
of a uniform federal policy.  It is unclear whether enough U.S. states 
will undertake such actions to spur a federal lobbying campaign, 
though the recent move by several major corporations to espouse a 
national mandatory cap-and-trade system42 suggests that this dynamic 
may be at work.  One may also question whether the 1970 Clean Air 
Act actually manifested this theory in action, because the theory im-
plies that industry would support federal uniform emissions controls 
preempting state variation, which the 1970 Clean Air Act did not 
adopt for stationary sources.43
IV.  ACTING GLOBALLY 
What, then, is the better path?  “The first-best policy to reduce car-
bon leakage is to increase the size of the group of abating countries.”44  
This group need not include all countries, but it—or a set of simulta-
39 See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Com-
mons:  The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223-26 (2005) (describing a 
“domino effect”). 
40 See supra text following note 33.  
41 See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution:  The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 
326-29 (1985). 
42 See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION 7-10 (2007) avail-
able at http://www.us-cap.org/ClimateReport.pdf (outlining a proposal for a federal 
cap-and-trade program); id. at 12 (noting that the partnership includes Alcoa, BP, 
Duke Energy, and General Electric).  This may also be a manifestation of a “Baptists 
and bootleggers” coalition.  See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
43 For stationary sources, the Clean Air Act permits states to set more stringent 
ambient standards than the NAAQS, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000), and it allows each state 
to design its own SIP containing the particular—and thus nonuniform—emissions 
standards imposed on industry to attain the NAAQS, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (requiring states 
to prepare and submit emissions control plans). 
44 SIJM ET AL., supra note 35, at 25. 
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neous groups—needs to cover all major present and future emitters.  I 
have been analyzing and advocating such an approach, involving ma-
jor developing countries as well as major industrialized countries in a 
cap-and-trade system, comprehensively addressing all major GHGs 
and their sources and sinks, for the past seventeen years.45  The recent 
spate of interest in subnational state-level litigation and regulation 
does not change my view of the superior merits of a comprehensive 
international regime.46
That said, global action need not be truly universal.  Including 
200 countries in treaty talks increases the transaction costs of negotiat-
ing, and many of those countries have very little influence on emis-
sions.47  As long as all the major current and future emitters are cov-
ered, leakage is substantially prevented.  The vast majority of global 
emissions—both current and future—could probably be addressed by 
a negotiation among the European Union, the United States, China, 
India, Russia, Japan, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Indonesia, which 
amounts to ten major actors, many of which are already parties to 
other international groups such as the G8 and OECD.  To be sure, 
other major future emitters should also be engaged, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and countries 
with rapid deforestation.  This list would also still be fewer than fifty 
countries.  The key is to encompass potential recipients of leakage as 
well as current emitters. 
And, global action need not be monolithic:  there could be a 
plurilateral system of several groups of countries in several regimes.  
For example, a new regime involving the United States, China, India, 
45 Some of this work includes (in chronological order):  Richard B. Stewart & 
Jonathan B. Wiener, A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change:  Using the Market To 
Protect the Environment, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 75; Richard B. Stewart & 
Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy:  Issues of Design 
and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83 (1992); Wiener, supra note 11; Jonathan 
B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue:  Legal Transplants and the Evolution of 
Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, De-
signing Global Climate Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY:  A SURVEY 151 (Stephen 
H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002); STEWART & WIENER, supra note 7. 
46 Nor do I think most of the authors in this Symposium would prefer the state-
level approach.  I think they are writing about it mainly for the understandable reasons 
that the lack of U.S. federal action impels alternative efforts, and that the state-level 
actions raise questions of U.S. domestic tort, administrative, and constitutional law on 
which U.S. law professors are well equipped to comment. 
47 This follows the insight of JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CAL-
CULUS OF CONSENT 113 (1962), that optimal jurisdiction size should expand until the 
added costs of decision making exceed the added benefits of internalizing extrajuris-
dictional externalities. 
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Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Australia could operate in parallel to 
the Kyoto regime for several years, offering the chance to test diversity 
in policy designs, and hence to learn from experimentation (although 
with the caveat about inconsistencies across regimes just noted).48  
Such a system could use an equitably structured cap-and-trade 
mechanism to engage participation by the major players.49
Inescapably, the problem is how to produce a global public good, 
via national consent, among heterogeneous countries.  The direct im-
plication of this problem is that the successful policy architecture must 
be not only collectively rational (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency), it must also 
be individually rational for those countries joining the regime (actu-
ally Pareto improving)—joining must offer net benefits to each par-
ticipating country over not joining.50  Those benefits can include cli-
mate protection as well as national cobenefits in public health (e.g., 
from reducing other pollutants), biodiversity conservation, energy se-
curity, and reputation.  Where national net benefits are not positive, 
some form of side payment will be needed to attract participation. 
In other words, although a substantially global regime is needed 
to protect the global environment, countries have diverse interests, so 
some mechanism is needed to make cooperation attractive to the 
countries significantly influencing the outcome.  For major develop-
ing countries whose priority is development—and who view climate 
change as being of low importance or even as benign—this means 
that climate policy must support their development goals, not impose 
obstacles or costs to their development.  Moreover, China, India, and 
Brazil are emerging as new “great powers” in a transforming world or-
der, and they will not be bullied (nor will the United States) into ac-
48 See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 7, at 96-112, 132.  The Asia-Pacific Partner-
ship on Clean Development and Climate, begun in 2006 and including Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, may make progress toward 
this kind of a regime, but at present it remains focused on technology research and 
not yet on a cap-and-trade system.  See generally Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean De-
velopment and Climate, http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org (last visited May 1, 
2007); ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CLEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE, PARTNER-
SHIP FOR ACTION 2006 (2006), http://www.dfat.gov.au/environment/climate/ap6/ 
appcdc-booklet-06.pdf. 
49 See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 7, at 70-75 (discussing policies designed to 
include developing countries in a cap-and-trade system); Wiener, supra note 11, at 721-
26 (same). 
50 See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD 27-30 (2000); Wiener, supra note 11, at 
743-47. 
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cepting someone else’s vision of the ideal climate regime.51  More 
likely, in my view, is that over the coming decades, a more multipolar 
geopolitical terrain will bring together a larger club of “great pow-
ers”—the United States, an organized Europe, a revived Russia, a surg-
ing China, India, Brazil, and perhaps a few others—in a complex web 
of multiplex relations, cooperating and jousting over trade, debt, na-
tional security, climate, and other issues. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere,52 a system of international 
emissions allowance trading offers the best method to engage partici-
pation in a climate regime (global or plurilateral), while limiting the 
distortionary inefficiencies of the necessary transnational side pay-
ments by embedding those side payments in the allocation of allow-
ances.53  This will not be easy, but it is the best option for reaching a 
mutually attractive bargain with the major players.  It would unleash 
the power of competitive markets to mobilize innovation and encour-
age the international diffusion of lower-emitting technologies.  It 
would not be inexpensive, but it would be less costly than letting cli-
mate change continue unabated, or using direct government-to-
government aid as a side payment, or imposing international carbon 
taxes (with some other method of transnational side payment), or 
spending government funds on pure technology research. 
 
51 The postulates that major countries cannot be bullied regarding climate policy, 
and that WTO disciplines would preclude trade measures adopted to shield countries’ 
subglobal emissions limitations against carbon leakage to unregulated countries (and 
thereby pressure those unregulated countries to act), may be tested if the U.N. Secu-
rity Council treats climate change as an international security issue warranting coercive 
measures, and/or if some countries (e.g., European countries, or at least France) 
move ahead with imposing border tax adjustments (tariffs) on the embedded carbon 
content of imports of goods and services from countries not limiting their emissions 
(e.g., the United States and perhaps China).  See Helena Spongenberg, Global Warming 
Wars:  EU Takes on France’s Carbon Tax Plan, BUS. WEEK.COM, Dec. 18, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/dec2006/gb20061218_681124.htm (re-
porting both the French border tax plan and the likely U.S. opposition to it).  On the 
difficult trade law and economic aspects of such border tax measures, see Cinnamon 
Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO:  Reconciling Tensions Between Free Trade and En-
vironmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’ Y  45, 71-74 (2006), and How-
ard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures To Protect the Global Environment, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154-60 (1995). 
52 See generally STEWART & WIENER, supra note 7; Wiener, supra note 11. 
53 Linkages among the major issues just noted, such as climate, trade, and security, 
could also serve as in-kind side payments.  And support for poor countries’ adaptation 
to climate change will also be needed—helping societies become more resilient to the 
impacts of sea level rise, drought, storms, spreading ranges of diseases such as malaria, 
and other projected effects of climate change. 
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*       *      * 
Subnational state-level actions may teach us some valuable lessons, 
but they are not the ideal solution to the global problem.  Does that 
imply—in a world without U.S. national action, where climate change 
is an important risk warranting preventive measures—that the U.S. 
states should therefore do nothing?  That is a hard case to make; but it 
also is hard to make the case that state-level action will accomplish 
much net benefit.  At the very least, the states taking initial action, 
such as California and RGGI, need to reduce leakage, increase their 
coverage of emissions, and broaden their allowance trading markets 
by engaging other states, the U.S. federal government, and other 
countries in as broad a national and international regime as possible.  
But this ambition may be constrained by the legal obstacles to state-
level action identified above, and by the states’ desire to experiment 
with differing policy designs and to foster a patchwork of policies that 
motivate federal action.  Subnational state-level action may thus be 
thwarted by its limited reach, legal obstacles, internal costs, external 
leakage, and conflicting objectives.  To solve a global externality, it 
will take global thinking and global action. 
 
